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Vol. VII JANUARY, 1932 No. 4
LEARNING IN THE LAW AND ADMISSION TO
PRACTICE
By THOMAS J. HuRLEY*
"Every person of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled
to admission to practice law in all courts of justice." Sec. 21, Art. 7,
Constitution of Indiana.
I had high hope that Professor Bernard Gavit would dis-
cover, in his search of its records, some evidence of the intention
of the Constitutional Convention of 1850 that no limit should be
placed upon the courts or the legislature in requiring educa-
tional qualifications in those presenting themselves for admis-
sion to practice law. He is a keen student and a tireless worker;
and if such proof were to be found he would uncover it. But
much as I desire his success and firmly as I believe that all appli-
cants for admission to practice law should be made to show
that they know the subject well, I am of the opinion that a fair
reading of the section of the constitution quoted does not war-
rant saying that it means what we would like to have it.
Protracted and involved argument should not be and is not
necessary to determine the meaning of such a simple sentence.
I find no ambiguity in it. As a consequence, if I am right, there
is then no need for applying legal rules of construction. "Good
moral character" is a phrase of such plain, everyday meaning
that the most simple of us knows its import. It is freely granted
that whether a particular person is of good or bad moral char-
acter may present its difficulties in a stated case; but that is not
involved here. There isn't any more uncertainty about its
meaning than the word "voter." "Shall be entitled to admis-
sion" is likewise wholly free from ambiguity.
* Of the Gary Bar.
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Very frankly it seems to me that the purpose in attempting
to impose construction upon this section is to accomplish an
end or purpose by indirection after the failure of the direct
attack; that is, after the miscarriage of two or three attempts
to amend this section of the Constitution by vote of the people,
some lawyers are contending that it means the same as though
the amendment were accomplished. Doing violence to plain
English language doesn't seem to be an obstacle at all.
By what authority can it be said that "entitled to admission"
means "entitled to take an examination on learning in the law?"
Admission means the privilege of entering and to add any con-
ditions or tags to it deprives it of its plain and usually accepted
sense. Let us apply it thus: "You are entitled to admission to
(enter) your house." Does that mean that you must first be
examined to determine if you know how to act after you enter?
Equally ridiculous is the postulate that one who seeks admis-
sion, not having the necessary learning in jurisprudence to equal
a standard that has not been determined in Indiana, is ipso facto
of bad moral character. The acrobatics of this proposition
show the sponsors to be in distress for reasons to uphold other
weak arguments and seeking to rely upon assumed lazy mental
processes of their listeners to get by with sophistry. One may
well be a very erudite lawyer and at the same time of such
rotten moral character that no one would associate with him.
Likewise he may be of the most excellent moral character and
know absolutely nothing of the laws nor the degree of pro-
ficiency necessary to practice it. Ignorance never has been, to
my knowledge, a factor in moral character. Do the proponents
of this anomalous doctrine mean that he cannot help knowing
that his lack of learning in this special field will, without any
possible chance to the contrary, result in losses to his pros-
pective clients and that in all honesty he must stay out of it or
be branded as of bad moral character? If so, they still are in
error. They reverse one of the most deeply-rooted presumptions
known to our law, that everyone is presumed to act in good faith
until the contrary is proved. But presumptions are not needed
in this case. How are we to decide that the applicant has not
ample learning in the law until after an examination? He re-
fuses to be examined because, as he contends, he has the right
reserved to him in the fundamental law to be admitted upon his
proof of good moral character and being a voter. That is what
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it says as plainly as it can be written; and that is what it means!
No mention or suggestion is made, expressly or by inference,
of an academic inquisition into his knowledge of law and pro-
cedure, much less of any means or method of doing it, nor by
whom.
No one seeking the services of a lawyer can be deceived or
defrauded in Indiana solely by reason of persons being admitted
to practice without legal learning. Everyone is presumed to
know the law which includes the Constitution. So they know
and are bound to know that he may be so admitted with no
other requirement than "good moral character, being a voter."
The contention of these gentlemen leads to some very strange
results, to say the least. We can not pass upon his ignorance of
nor his learning in the law without proof; and that must come
from within his mind after the examination. If he persists in
keeping the extent of his knowledge to himself, when shall we
reach a decision as to his character? Should he submit to the
examination and fail to pass, regardless of the standard set, he
must be of bad moral character. He later has the stain removed
and is restored to good moral character by reading law books.
Or, he is of good moral character in one county and bad in
another, measured by the kind or severity of examination he is
subjected to; or perhaps dependent upon whether he has friends
on the board; or maybe their own learning or lack of learning
in the law. Whether the judge slept well or had a bad break-
fast might also have its effect.
That time has varied the precise shade of meaning of words
is true but makes no difference. Let them be defined as of today
but do not distort them. The stumbling block in this affair is
that the thing has been written into and is an integral part of
our state constitution, with all of the incidents of that exalted
place. Of course, it should not have been put there. I agree.
But it is there. And it was put there as a limitation upon the
powers that govern. The courts will not be so fast in declaring
that the convention, with its many learned lawyers, when it
said "entitled to admission," meant "not entitled to admission,"
or "entitled to seek admission," or anything else so foolish. I
will look for at least one dissenting opinion when the Supreme
Court affirms the decision of a trial judge that an applicant was
found to be a voter and of good moral character, but that having
failed to pass the examination prescribed by the committee his
208 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
good moral character vanished mysteriously and his petition
was denied.
Let us abandon efforts to amend the Constitution by judicial
construction and fallacious argument and put the question to
the people in the method prescribed by law if a change is neces-
sary, and keep at it until the time comes that a sufficient num-
ber of votes are cast to say if the- change is wanted by the people
or not. The entire basic law of the State can be annulled by
changing the dictionary. But I think that will not happen.
